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Abstract:  In 2009 Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize for her analysis of economic 
governance of the commons. Specifically, by challenging the conventional wisdom at the 
time, demonstrating how communities can successfully manage the common resources 
without any regulation by central authorities or privatization. Ostrom proposed eight design 
principles that identify the underlying criterion of institutions that have successfully 
maintained CPRs over time. I examine whether Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles affect the 
long-run functionality of borehole wells in Uganda using quantitative methods.  I find that 
the one of the principles, clearly defined boundaries, is significant in all four estimations, and 
remains significant after all robustness test.   
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“What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of 
his own, hardly at all the common interest.” –Aristotle  
 
I. Introduction 
 
As the global population grows, humans increase their reliance on the planet and continue 
to put extensive stress on our natural resources.  It is therefore critical that we understand 
how resources are managed and maintained.  Many natural resources are categorized as 
common pool resources.  A common pool (CPRs) resource is defined as a type of good that is 
either a natural or human made resource system that is “non-excludable” but “rival” so that 
the units of use are exhaustible (e.g. forests, fisheries, irrigation systems, and 
groundwater).  Many scholars have argued that individuals are not able to cooperate in order 
to protect and sustain the long-run use of common pool resources. Before the 1980s most of 
the literature and policies presumed that the management of CPRs was only successful when 
enforced by external forces, such as the state or markets.   Scholars recommended 
privatization or government centralization based on the theories of Gordon (1954), Olson 
(1965), Demsetz (1967), Hardin (1967), and Dawes (1975). However, in the mid-1980s, much 
of the literature began to questions these theories and their effectiveness in maintaining CPRs 
over time (Feeny et al. 1990). 
Elinor Ostrom received the Nobel Prize in 2009 for her analysis of economic governance 
of the commons. Specifically, by challenging the conventional wisdom at the time, 
demonstrating how communities can successfully manage the common resources without any 
regulation by central authorities or privatization. Ostrom argued that the greatest problem 
facing CPR management is that of organizing individuals away from independent decision 
making towards the adoption of coordination in order to increase joint benefit and reduce 
harm.  This does not necessarily imply creating an organization, but rather the “process of 
organizing,” requiring changes that order activities so that they are sequential, contingent, and 
repeated.  This occurs through repeated actions to increase the likelihood that the changes in 
activities evolve and survive. (Ostrom 1990) 
In her (1990) textbook Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action, 
Ostrom proposes a theoretical alternative to centralization or privatization that relies on the 
low transaction cost of information amongst resource users; the enforcement is not externally 
enforced, but rather internally by the users themselves. The users make a binding contract in 
order to maintain a cooperative strategy that they have created and agreed upon, incorporating 
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the cost of monitoring into the benefits, which are divided equally amongst all 
users.   (Ostrom 1990)   
To test this theory empirically, Ostrom evaluated 14 cases of CPR management 
institutions, which varied in degrees of success in the long-run maintenance of each resource. 
Each CPR was located within one country and the number of users varied between 50 to 
15,000 people.  The users were dependent on the CPR for economic returns, and thus were 
motivated to solve the common problems related to CPR management and enhance their own 
productivity over time.  Each case provided clear information about the process involved in: 
(1) governing long-enduring CPRs, (2) transforming existing institutional arrangements, and 
(3) failing to overcome continued CPR problems.  Each case was used to understand how 
“individuals organize and govern themselves to obtain collective benefits in situations where 
the temptations to free-ride and to break commitment is substantial.” (Ostrom 1990) 
 Based on the evaluation of these 14 CPR management institutions, Ostrom constructed 
a set of eight design principles (listed below) that identify the underlying criterion of 
institutions that have successfully maintained CPRs over time and how this affects the 
incentives (by reducing uncertainty through trust and norms of reciprocity) of the participants 
to continue investing time and effort in the governance and management of the 
CPR.  Defining the principles as,  “…an essential element or conditions that help to account 
for the success of these institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of 
generations after generations of appropriators to the rules in use.” (Ostrom 1990)  
 
Table 1.1 Design Principles: “Self-Organized Resource-Governance Regimes” - Ostrom 1990 
1. Clearly defined boundaries:  participants know who is in and who is out of a defined set of 
relationships and thus with whom to cooperate.  
2. Local Rules-in-use restrict the amount, timing, and technology of harvesting the resource; 
allocate benefits proportional to required inputs; and are crafted to take local condition 
into account.  
3. Collective-choice arrangements:  most of the individual affected by a resource regime can 
participate in making and modifying the rules.  
4. Monitoring:  regimes select their own monitor, who are accountable to the users or are users 
themselves and who keep an eye on resource conditions as well as on user behavior.  
5. Use graduated sanctions that depend on the seriousness and context of the offense  (“quasi-
voluntary” cooperation). (Levi 1988) 
6. Access to rapid, low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and 
officials— local mechanisms to air conflict immediately and resolutions that are generally 
known in the community  
7. Whether the regime is recognized by the national or local government   
 
For CPRs that are parts of lager systems 
8. Nested enterprises – all other principles are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.  
! 
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A considerable volume of literature1 has examined the validity of Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles with mixed results.  However, a majority of the literature has been descriptive case 
studies; very few have been statistical, none of which have focused exclusively on Ostrom 
(Cox 2001).  This paper looks at the quantitative relationship of Water User Committees, in 
terms of Ostrom’s Design Principles, and the long-run functionality of 60 borehole wells in 
rural Uganda. First, I use a methodology to construct an index variable for seven of the Eight 
Ostrom Design Principles, from 57 individual survey questioned designed based of Ostrom’s 
theory.  I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, 
collective action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index.  This allows me to quantify 
each of the principles using several variables for each.   I am the first, to my knowledge, to us 
such an approach in in this body of literature.   
Second, I use four different dependent variables to measure the functionality of the well.  
The first variable is binary, functioned or broken at the time of survey.  I use a linear 
probability, logit, and probit model to estimate the relationship against each design principle.  
The second two dependent variables are the “number of times the well was fixed” and “the 
number of times it broke”.  For these dependent variables I use a Poisson estimation.  The 
final variable is an Anderson Index of all three dependent variables, using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation.  
 I find that the Boundary Principle is significant in all four estimations, and remains 
significant after all robustness test, except in the case of the final OLS regression. This finding 
aligns with the pervious literature, in particular the meta-analysis of 91 studies, which found 
boundaries to be significant a majority of the time. (Cox 2010) When regressing the indices on 
“the number of times the well was fixed” I find that local rules, sanctions, and conflict are also 
significant but after the bonferroni-holm step-down test both conflict and sanctions are no 
longer significant.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes and critiques theories 
based on external enforcement of CPRs and studies on internal enforcement including 
Ostrom. Section III presents the methodology for this study, which outlines how the data was 
collected, general summary statistics of how well the wells function and the empirical model 
and hypothesis. Section IV focuses on the results of the study. Section V presents the 
conclusion and policy implication of the study.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 See Table 10 for a summary table of key research  
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II. Literature Review  
Before the 1980s most of the literature and policies presumed that the management of 
CPRs was only successful when enforced by external forces, such as the state or markets.   There 
are three models that are generally relied on for policy prescription; one is Hardin’s “tragedy of 
the commons”, the second is the Prisoner’s Dilemma model of strategic choice, and the final is 
Olson’s collective action.  However, the application of such theories has achieved results that are 
mixed at best. An explanation of each concept and a summarization of the critiques of each 
model follow. 
 
“Tragedy of the commons”  
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” proposes that individuals are short-term, self-
interested, “rational” actors that seek to maximize their own gains. As such, people will exploit 
commons as long as the cost to them personally is less then the benefits they receive. Hardin 
illustrates this point by using the example of a pasture “open to all” with many herders. Each 
herder receives a direct benefit from his own cattle so his instinct is to increase the number of 
cattle to maximize his benefit.  However, because each herder is increasing the cattle 
simultaneously the individual farmer suffers from delayed cost from the decline of the 
commons, which then leads to overgrazing.   
“Therin is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination 
toward which all man rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons”  (Hardin 1968) 
 
This theory, however, assumes that the individual (in this case the herder) does not have 
any information about the aggregate state of the CPR or the tipping point in which the resource 
will be fully exploited and collapse.  Empirically this assumption may hold in situations such as 
ocean whaling or extensive commons grazing lands used by scattered communities, but the 
assumption does not hold in many other cases of CPRs.  (Wade 1987) The pressing issue here 
being that the amount of information each individual using the commons has about the larger 
picture of the resource in which they are operating in is not always limited. (Kimber 1983).   
Hardin’s theory also does not distinguish between CPRs that are necessary to the 
individuals’ survival, and those that are not.   Kimber argues in “The Tragedy of the Commons 
Reappraised” that it is more likely that the logic behind the theory will hold only when the 
resource is not vital.  The argument being that when survival is at risk the ‘rational’ individual act 
out of self-control so as not to destroy their mode of survival.  (Kimber 1983) 
! 
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Likewise, Hardin does not distinguish between a resource that is open to all (no property 
rights) and one that is of joint property (common property rights).  The case of joint property is 
vastly different from that of open access to all.  It is much more likely users will adhere to rules 
of restricted use with common property, due to the fact that a certain user group that is precise 
and therefore easier to define binds access.  By ignoring this distinction all CPRs are falsely 
generalized as common property.  (Wade 1987) 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Hardin’s model is often formalized by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (Dawes 1975) A 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game that conceptualizes a non-cooperative situation in which two or 
more individual’s outcome depends on the other’s choice.  By choosing the individual dominate 
strategy, given the assumption that the player is not aware of the other player’s choice/action, 
players always choose the strategy to defect, no matter what the other player chooses.  This 
produces an equilibrium that is the third-best result for each player; a Pareto-optimal but also 
Pareto-inferior as the better, unstable, equilibrium would be if both cooperated.  (Ostrom 1990) 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma has captivated social scholars, as it seems to provide an 
explanation to the paradox in which rational individual strategies can lead to collectively 
irrational outcomes, challenging the concept that rational human beings should attain rational 
outcomes. (Ostrom 1990)  
However, there are two key assumptions that need to hold in order for the model to 
work.  One being that the players do not communicate with one another before making their 
choice.  The second being that the choice holds and cannot be revoked once discovering the 
other player’s choice.  The first assumption implies that the players aren’t able to negotiate with 
one another to reach an optimal outcome. Therefore the change in the rules or negotiation has 
to come, if at all, from an external force.  (Wade 1987)   This could be the case in some instances 
in which monitoring is extremely difficult or impossible and so restricting access is also difficult 
and therefore the individual can defect without cost. Examples include:  air pollution, 
international waters, or resources that exist in two or more regions/states.    
The logic changes when the game is played repeatedly where the chances that the 
individuals will co-operate increases now in hopes that others do so in the future. This is also the 
case if either of the assumptions is relaxed; if the individual learns quickly what the other 
chooses and can alter their own choice or if they are able to negotiate amongst themselves, the 
equilibrium flips to co-operate. (Wade 1987) 
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Collective Action 
 The core proposition of Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action is that “unless the 
number of individual is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to 
make individuals act in their common interest, the rational, self-interested individual will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests.”(Olson 1965) The principle of the theory being that an 
individual who can not be excluded from the benefits of a collective good once it is produced 
has no or little incentive to contribute to the provision of the good in the first place.  Thus 
cooperation is a question of how noticeable each individual’s actions are and by how strong 
social bonds are.   (Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990) 
 The core of each one of these models, including Olson’s, is the problem of free-riding.  
Whenever one individual cannot be excluded from the benefits that are provided by the good or 
resource, each individual has the incentive not to contribute to either the provision or 
maintenance of the good/resource but rather to “free ride” on others’ efforts.  The extreme of 
such an outcome being that if all individual decided to “free-ride, the good or resource would 
not be provided and/or heavily exploited; the sub-optimal outcome is when some individuals 
“free-ride” when others don’t and optimal level of provision is not achieved.  (Ostrom 1990, 
Wade 1987) 
According to Elinor Ostrom, in the most general terms the other greatest problem 
facing CPR management is that of organizing:  how to change the situation from independent 
decision making to one in which individuals adopt coordination in order to increase joint benefit 
and reduce harm.  This does not necessary imply creating an organization, but rather the process 
of organizing, requiring changes that order activities so that they are sequential, contingent, and 
repeated.  This occurs through repeated actions to increase the likelihood of the changes in 
activities evolve and survives. (Ostrom 1990) 
Ostrom argues that, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the prisoners are not able to change the 
constraints imposed upon them, because they are in jail.  This is, however, not the case for all 
users of CPRs.  She addresses this with an articulate quote, “As long as individuals are viewed as 
prisoners, policy prescriptions will address this metaphor.  I would rather address the questions 
of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the 
game to lead to outcomes other then remorseless tragedies.” (Ostrom 1990)  
In response to the idea that the influence these models have on state and market policies 
does not produce the only or optimal solutions, Ostrom proposed her alternative solution of the 
8 design principles (as mentioned above), that rely on the low transaction cost of information 
amongst resource users:  the enforcement is not externally enforced, but rather internally by the 
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users themselves; and the users of the resource themselves make a binding contract in order to 
maintain a cooperative strategy that they created and agreed upon.  Incorporating the cost of 
monitoring into the benefits, which is divided equally amongst all users. (Ostrom 1990)  
 It is important to note two other seminal works on the analysis of local based efforts to 
manage and govern CPRs:  Robert Wade’s Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action 
in South and Baland and Platteau’s Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is there a role for rural 
communities?  These works (as well as Ostrom’s), are among the first comparative studies to 
examine theoretical development of the time and use theory to inform their analysis of self-
governed CPRs.  All three share many overlapping conclusions.  
 In his study of 31village irrigation systems, Wade concludes that effective rules of 
restraint on access and use are not likely to be sustainable when boundaries are unclear, when 
users are not in one location, and when monitoring is difficult.  He identifies 14 conditions, all 
and all, to be imperative to the sustainability and management of CPRs. (Wade 1988, Argawal 
2001)   
 Baland and Platteau, on the other hand, use a large number of studies of CPRs to 
conduct a comprehensive review and synthesis.  After examining competing theoretical claims 
on different types of property regimes and a wide range of empirical studies on CPRs that focus 
on several variables, they conclude with results that are similar to Ostrom’s and Wade’s:  CPRs 
are successful when there are small user groups, effective enforcement, past experience of 
cooperation, external aid and strong leadership and the users are near the resource. (Baland & 
Platteau 1996, Argawal 2001) 
 Table 2.1 summarizes and lists under the four categories (resource system characteristics, 
group characteristics, institutional arrangements and the external environment) the conditions 
the three authors have identified as significant to the long-run management of CPRs.  Compiled 
by Argawal in the review Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.  
 
 Table 2.1 Synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and 
Platteau 
1.  Resource system characteristics  
i)  Small size (RW)  
i)  Well-defined boundaries (RW, EO) 
 
2.  Group characteristics  
(i)  Small size (RW, B&P)  
(ii)  Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO)  
(iii)  Shared norms (B&P)  
(iv)  Past successful experiences---social capital (RW, B&P)  
! 
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(v)  Appropriate leadership---young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local 
traditional elite (B&P) 
 (vi)  Interdependence among group members (RW, B&P)  
(vii)  Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests (B&P) 
 
1. and 2. Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics  
(i)  Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P)  
(ii) High levels of dependence by group members on resource system(RW)  
(iii) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources (B&P) 
 
3. Institutional arrangements  
(i) Rules are simple and easy to understand (B&P) 
 (ii) Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, B&P)  
(iii) Ease in enforcement of rules (RW, EO, B&P)  
(iv) Graduated sanctions (RW, EO)  
(v) Availability of low cost adjudication (EO)  
(vi) Accountability of monitors and other officials to users (EO, B&P) 
 
1. and 3. Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements  
(i) Match restrictions on harvest to generation of resources (RW,EO) 
 
4. External environment 
 (i) Technology: Low cost exclusion technology (RW)  
(ii) State: 
(a) Central governments should not undermine local authority (RW, EO)  
(b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P)  
(c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities (B&P)  
(d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO) 
(Argawal 2001) 
 A substantial volume of literature, both empirical and qualitative, has accrued concerning 
the usefulness and validity of Ostrom’s design principles.  According to a meta-analysis, in which 
of 91 studies (from search of academic databases, relevant journals, and the Political Theory and 
Policy at Indiana University) each design principle varies in significance and overall importance 
to the long-run maintenance of the resource. The most strongly supported principles are: 
boundaries, but only in the around community users and not the physical boundaries; adherence 
to local conditions and proportional cost incurred to benefits received; and the presence of 
monitors that are users of the resource.  The rest of the principles were only moderately 
supported by the data in the 91 studies included in the meta-analysis.  Each variable was coded 
and tested for ordinance and to determine whether the variables were independent from the 
success variables.  (Cox 2010)   
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III. Methodology  
Data 
Local community-level cooperation of ground water management in Uganda has varied over 
time. Starting in the 1930s, groundwater development has consisted of the construction of deep 
boreholes, drip systems, shallow wells and protected springs. In 2006 there were approximately 
20,000 deep boreholes, 3,000 shallow wells and 12,000 protected springs in Uganda constructed 
mainly for rural domestic water supply. Under the Rural Water Supply Investment Plan of 2000, 
construction of an additional 40,000 hand-pumped boreholes and 30,000 shallow wells were 
needed in order to reach the 2015 Water Sector targets.2 The 1995 Water Act required that every 
source water point in Uganda have a Water User Committee (WUC) to maintain the water 
source through community organization. In some cases these committees have been successful 
and others the water points have fallen into disrepair.  
In this study, data was collected on the unit level of the WUC of 60 borehole wells in 
villages spread over fifteen sub-counties within Ruhaama County in the Ntungamo District of 
Uganda. All of the wells were drilled by Living Water, an NGO, from 2010 to 2014. The 
WUCs surveyed for this study were randomly selected from all wells drilled by Living Water in 
the Ruhaama County. For each WUC, 1 to 4 members were individually surveyed. The majority 
of the data in this analysis is based on the WUC unit, aggregated at the mean response of each 
committee member. In general the variation between answers was much greater across WUCs 
than within the individual WUC. 
 
General Functioning of the Water User Committees 
 Of the 60 committees surveyed, 42 reported how long they have been active; of these, 
10 have been active since 2010, 11 since 2011, 13 since 2012 and 8 since 2013.  Of the 60 wells, 
29 (48%) have active WUCs. Of the 37 functioning wells, 62% have active WUCs. Of the 23 
non-functioning wells, 26% have active WUCs and 74% don't.  From anecdotal evidence it 
appears that quite a few of the WUCs disbanded after the wells broke the first time. The other 
reasons mentioned included that the committees became inactive when the elected or 
appointed members realized they would not be compensated or they weren’t trained so felt ill-
equipped to address the issues of maintenance and repair.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!UN-Water; World Water Assessment Programme (2006).National Water Development Report: Uganda. Prepared for 2nd 
UN World Water Development Report "Water, a shared responsibility".. Retrieved October 2, 2014 !
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Each WUC is required to have a president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary. Most of 
the WUC members are either elected or appointed; of the 60 committees, 32 reported being 
elected by vote and 19 reported being appointed.   Usually the elections took place at a town 
meeting directly after the well has been constructed.  It is not mandatory to attend these 
meetings and so only those who show up, vote.  Based on qualitative evidence a majority of the 
presidents and vice presidents are prominent members of the community: principles of the 
local school, doctors, store owners, etc.  Of the 60 wells only 20 of the WUCs reported holding 
regular elections.  
The regularity of convening a meeting with all committee members varied among 
WUCs.  Of the 60 committees, 22 reported meeting at least once every 3-6 months, 3 once a 
year, 4 in the last five years, 5 never, and 1 every month. General meetings attended by all 
households who use the well, are usually held twice a year.  Only 1 committee reported holding 
a general meeting every month, 22 said they hold one every 3 to 6 months, 8 said they meet 
once a year, 7 biannually, and 13 reported never having a general meeting.   
 Twenty-three of the committees surveyed reported collecting fees for future 
maintenance costs; most committees collected a monthly fee and 3 WUCs collected fees per 
use of the well (use was regulated by locking the well house and appointing a caretaker who 
was responsible for the key and allowing people to use the well). Only 25 of the WUCs 
reported the average amount of the fee collected; of the WUCs that reported, the average 
amount of each fee varied substantially from 750 UGX to 7000 UGX (from about 22 cents to 
2 USD). 
Of the 60 Borehole Wells sampled, 37 (68%) still functioned and 23 were broken. Of the 
27 wells drilled in 2010, 15 were functioning at the time of the survey, 8 of the 15 drilled in 
2011, 9 of the 12 in 2012, 4 of the 5 in 2013, and zero of the 1 in 2014 (see Chart 1).   Of the 
60 wells, 21 had never stopped functioning at the time of the survey; of the wells that had 
stopped functioning, 27 had been repaired and 12 had not yet been repaired at the time of the 
survey.  The number of times the wells had broken varied between 1 and 9.  The shortest 
amount of time it took to repair a well was one day the longest was 52 days, excluding the 
wells that had not yet been repaired.  
Of the 37 functioning wells, 32 were used regularly. However, only 22 (59%) of the 37 wells 
were used for drinking water; meaning that of the 60 wells only 37% of them are used to obtain 
drinking water (see Chart 2).  This is most likely due to high levels of iron content in some of 
the wells, a result of high levels in the groundwater or possibly from the piping itself.  No tests 
of the water iron levels were conducted at the time of the survey but the question was asked, 
! 
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“Does the community use the water for drinking?  And if not why?”  A majority of the answers 
to the question “why,” were that the water was orange in color and when boiled turned 
everything, including the pot black; both of these are indicators of high iron contamination.  
 
Approach  
In The Governing the Commons, Ostrom makes the assumption that people with effective 
CPR institutions are “good,” meaning that in general the members of the institutions are 
individuals that share a past and expect to share a future (reducing their discount rates).  They 
tend not to vary much in assets, skill, knowledge, and ethnicity.  Ostrom also states, “This list 
of design principles is still quite speculative.  I am not yet willing to argue that these design 
principles are necessary conditions for achieving institutional robustness in CPR 
settings.  More empirical work is needed.” (Ostrom 1990) 
 Thus, it could be argued that Ostrom does not make a causal claim but rather that of a 
correlation between presence of the criterion of design principles and positive outcome of a 
sustained CPR over time.  Therefore, in terms of an effective identification strategy, it is not 
as imperative as we are more interested in conditional correlation than causation.   However, 
with that said control variables will be used in the regressions to take into account both the 
physical and environmental conditions of the wells.    
  In order to test Ostrom’s theory that the presence of the 8 Design Principles are 
positively correlated with sustaining CPRs over the long-run the following methods will be 
used; (a) test whether of any of the 57 variables designed to measure the different aspects of the 
design principles are necessary or sufficient in terms of the functioning of the 60 borehole wells 
surveyed in this study; (b) test the correlation between each of the design principles and the 
function of the well; (c) regress the design principles against four different dependent variables 
that measure the long-run functionality of the 60 borehole wells; and (d) run a series of 
regressions on all 127 combinations of each variable against the functionality of each well. 
 
Empirical Specification: 
 !"#$%&'#! =!∝ !+!!! !"#$% + !! !"#$% + !! !!!!"#$%&" + !! !"#$%"&+ !! !"#$%&'# + !! !"#$%&'( + !! !"#ℎ!"#$% + !!!!
 
 To estimate the correlation I run three different regressions each with a different 
dependent variable. The three dependent variables are used to measure how well the 
boreholes functioned: (a) whether the well functions on inspection or not; (b) how many 
! 
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times the well has broken since it was installed; and (c) number of times it has been repaired in 
that time. A fourth dependent variable was constructed using an Anderson Index matrix.   
 For the dependent variables in all three sets I use the method outlined in Anderson 
(2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor, sanction, conflict and 
authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique information 
in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally.  Refer to Table 1 for variables 
used in each individual index.   
  Based on Ostrom’s hypothesis one would expect to see a positive correlation of each of 
the design principles. In terms of the regression, conclusion on the causal relationships will not 
be possible, only the likelihood that the well functions in the presence of the design principles.  
  Ostrom’s Principles are more qualitative than quantitative in nature; in order to 
accurately measure the criterion many dichotomous (often with yes or no answers) or 
categorical variables were constructed. Due to the relatively small sample size of 60 wells in this 
study, statistical power is limited, and thus testing many independent variables could result in 
multiple inference, where significant coefficients may emerge simply by chance. (Anderson 
2008) In order to control for this, the number of independent variables is reduced by 
implementing the use of summary indices; i.e., each index combines multiple measures to 
reduce the total number of tests conducted. 
In this study select dependent variables were categorized into groups according to seven 
of Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles: clearly defined boundaries; rules that adapt to local 
condition; collective choice that allow users to participate in the process; effective monitoring; 
graduated sanctions; mechanisms for conflict resolution; recognition from higher level 
authority; and nested enterprises. However, the eighth principle (nested enterprises) is only 
relevant for large common-pool resources so will not be included in this study. From each 
group of variables an individual index was constructed using an Anderson Index, so that each 
design principle has its own matrix variable.   
i . Boundaries :  Individuals or households who have the rights to withdraw resource units 
from the CPR as well as the boundaries of the CPR itself must be clearly defined, as 
must the boundaries of the CPR itself.  The theory underlying this principle is an 
important one: if the boundaries are not defined the resource is left open to 
“outsiders,” and the appropriator (those using/maintaining the resource) risk any of 
the benefits produced by their efforts being reaped by others who have not 
contributed to the maintenance of the resource, causing the appropriator to have little 
interest or incentive in coordinating and investing in the resources.  In the WUC 
survey of the boreholes in Uganda this was measured by: whether or not the WUCs 
had a list of households that used the well; if the list was updated; and if the list of well 
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users was used to collect fees. Of the 60 WUCs only 20 of the reported having a list; of 
those only 12 said they updated the list.   
i i . Local Rules :  Appropriation of rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or 
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision of rules 
requiring labor, materials, and/or money.  In all the successful cases studied by 
Ostrom, the rules reflect the specific attributes of the particular resource and thus help 
to maintain the resource over time.  In the case of the Ugandan borehole study, one of 
the major tasks/rules of the WUC is to mobilize the community labor to maintain and 
repair the well. The purpose of the organization is to make sure there is a fence around 
the well, the surrounding area is kept clean, the water catchment areas is protected and 
also to regulate activities that can or cannot be conducted around the borehole. Of the 
60 committees 35 reported organizing the committee for orderly use. 
i i i . Collec t ive  Choice :  Most individuals affected by the operational rules should be able 
to participate in modifying the operational rules, allowing the appropriators to tailor 
rules to local circumstances. As the individuals who directly interact and know the 
resource, are better able to modify the rules to fit specific local circumstances.  This 
keeps the cost of changing rules relatively low.  To measure this in terms of the WUCs, 
the members were asked in the survey if:  they had a constitution and by-laws; how 
well the households using the well understood the laws; how well the rules changed; if 
the rules were perceived as fair; if the committee members were elected; if the 
household members could revise the rules; and how many household know about the 
rules that guide the committee.  
iv . Monitor ing:  Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, 
should either be accountable to the appropriators or are appropriators themselves. The 
presence of a monitor brings people who do not comply with the rules to the attention 
of the community, which helps enforce the rules and strengthens trust.   The caretaker 
(usually a member of the community) of the borehole wells surveyed in Uganda takes 
on this job; although there was the rare case in which a watchman was also hired.  To 
measure the principle of monitoring, the survey posed the following questions to the 
WUCs: if a caretaker has been assigned; and if they had hired a watchman.  Of the 60 
wells, approximately 40 of the 60 reported having a caretaker.   
v . Sanct ions:  Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be given graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both.  This helps 
to maintain community trust and cohesion, increasing their willingness to make a 
contingent self-commitment.  As sanctioning occurs on a case-by-case basis it is 
necessary to take into account the severity of the violations.  To measure the 
occurrence and severity of sanctioning,  the survey asked the WUC members if and at 
what cost the following activities were sanctioned: washing clothes, washing your 
jerrycan (container for transporting water), watering your cows at the well; vandalizing 
the well; refusing to pay fees; or defecating by or near the well.  
v i .  Confl i c t  Resolut ion:  Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and 
officials. Individuals can interpret rules differently so conflict can be unavoidable at 
times.  Thus, if users are going to follow rules over a long period time, discussions 
resolving what constitutes an infraction need to be organized on a consistent 
basis.  The questions on the borehole survey that measured how conflict was resolved 
were as follows:  can household members call meetings and, if so, how many meetings 
have been called; are rules changed at the suggestion of the households; and are you 
able to remove a committee member for poor performance.  
! 
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vi i .  Authori ty :  The rights of the appropriators to devise their own institutions should not 
be challenged by external governmental authorities.  This stipulates that an external 
government agency does not undermine or challenge the rules devised by the local 
users. For the WUCs this was measured by: whether or not they were registered at the 
local district level; and who asked them to form the WUC: a Community Based 
Organization, LivingWater, an NGO other than LivingWater, or the government.  
 
Description of the independent variables of the indices, including their mean values with 
standard deviation and the range of variation, are given in Table 1. 
Each of the seven summary indices consolidates many of the multiple independent 
variables, but we still have seven to test.  So in order to control for over testing and maintain 
the number of indices the p values will be adjusted by using a Family-wise Error Rate (FWER) 
control.  Where a family of M hypotheses, H1, H2,…HM, is tested, of which J are true (J<M). 
As more hypotheses are added to a family the probability of rejecting at least one of them at a 
given significance level increases, and thus FWER increases. In this research, the family of 
tested hypotheses is the set of the seven Ostrom summary index tests.  The common 
technique is the Bonferonni correction, however in this study will use a step-down 
Bonferonni-Holm resampling method that is concerned to be more powerful in the literature.  
As mentioned above the result of this study cannot be concluded as causal due to the 
nature of the observational data collected and the possible endogeneity in the error term 
caused by omitted variable bias.  In order to test the effect of the omitted variable bias two 
bounds tests will be conducted. The first approach uses a method by Altonji, Elder and Taber 
(2001) to assess the results of the OLS where each Ostrom Index is regressed on the Function 
Index.  The Altonji, Elder and Taber (AET) proposes an estimation of the bias, due to 
endogeneity, in the OLS estimation assuming that the relationship between the effect to the 
treatment and the unobservable is proportional to the relationship between treatment and 
unobservable variables.   From this assumption a bias correction can be obtained and a point 
estimate of this ratio.   Emily Oster (2015) builds on framework showing that it is necessary to 
take into account coefficient movement and movements in the R-squared values to identify 
the omitted variable bias. I will use this to obtain the ratio of influence of the observable to 
unobservable variables on each Ostrom Index and a given bound on the beta coefficient.  
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IV. Results 
  In order to determine the relationship of the 57 individual variables to the functionality 
of the well, each variable was cross-tabulated with the binary function variable; 0 being that the 
well is broken and 1 that it functions.  Of the 57 variables none of them were sufficient or 
necessary on their own. Twelve of the variables, however, were significant when tested by a 
Pearson’s and likelihood-ratio test, which test the hypothesis that the rows and columns in a 
two-way table are independent. (Campbell 2007)  Table 2 shows the results of the cross-
tabulated variables that were significant. The main finding were that 90% of the wells that had a 
list of housed that used the well functioned; 88% of the wells that were regularly used by the 
household function; 84% of the wells that used the water for drinking functioned.  The rest of 
the variables ranged from 60% to 80%.  
The second test was to see if any of seven indices are correlated with whether or not the 
well functions. Table 3 displays the results for each index in terms of four different measures 
of the dependent variables listed above. Column (1) is the binary function; column (2) is how 
many times it was fixed; column (3) is number of times the well needed to be repaired; and 
column (4) is the index of all three.  
The boundary index is strongly correlated to each of the four dependent variables; .36 in 
terms of the binary function; .57 to number of times fixed; .47 to number of times repairs 
were necessary, and .29 for the function index.  In order to check for significance and control 
for over testing, each of the dependent variables were run as a pairwise correlation with a 
Bonferroni adjustment to calculate the significance levels.  The boundary index is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in terms of correlation between both number of times the well was 
fixed and number of repairs.  The local rules index is statistically significant at the 5% level in 
terms of correlation with the number of times the well was fixed.  
Table 4 displays the results of the impact of the 7 Ostrom Design Principles on the 
functioning of the well.   Whether or not a well functioned is a discrete decision (functions or 
broken) and is thus evaluated using a discrete regression model.3  Column (1) is a Linear 
Probability Model (2) is a Logit Model and (3) is a Probit Model.   
The results in terms of sign of the coefficient and significance are constant across all three 
models. The coefficient of the LP model is approximately .25 of the Logit and .40 of the 
Probit.  The boundary index is found to have a positive statistically significant effect on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Where the coefficient are as the “odds ratio,” so they are interpreted as more or less likely not by 
magnitude  
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functionality. This suggests that having strong boundaries in terms of having a user list and 
maintaining the well frequently increase the likelihood that the well is functioning.  Both 
monitoring and collective indices have positive coefficients but neither of them is 
significant.  This implies that monitoring or collective-choice arrangements do not increase 
the likelihood that the well functions.  Contrary to Ostrom’s hypothesis both local rules and 
sanctions have a negative coefficient, but neither is significant.  
Table 5 displays the results of the impact of the 7 Ostrom Design Principles on the 
functioning of the well in terms of how many times it has needed repair and how many times 
it was fixed. Both dependent variables in this case are count data so the Poisson Model is 
used.  Column (1) is the dependent variable for the number of times the well was fixed; 
column (2) is the number of times the well needed repair.  To check for over-dispersion of the 
data, a post-estimation was conducted.  The p-value on the Chi-squared test was significant, 
so robust standard errors were used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
In terms of the number of times the well was fixed all of the signs for the indices are 
positive except for the conflict and authority index. This is contrary to what Ostrom 
hypothesized, however the authority index is not statically significant and the conflict index is 
significant at the 10% level.  Both the boundary and local rules index are positive and 
statistically significantly at the 1% level; the sanction index is also positive and significant at 
the 10% level.   To test for over-testing a Bonferroni-Holm correction was used; the boundary 
index and local rules remain significant at the 1% level, however the conflict index is no 
longer significant.  
In terms of the number of times the well needed to be repaired the signs of the 
coefficients have mixed results. Similar to the number of times fixed the authority index is 
negatively correlated along with the monitoring index; however neither of the coefficients is 
significant.  Again both the boundary and local rules index are positively correlated and 
significant at the 1% level.  After the Bonferroni-Holm correction the only the boundary 
index is still significant at the 5% level.  
Table 6 displays the results of the OLS regression using the function index as the 
dependent variable.  Column (1) is regress just the seven indices (2) includes the control for 
condition of the water (3) includes the control for the year the well was constructed (4) 
includes both controls.  Robust standard errors were used to control for heteroskedasticity.  
The only index that is positively correlated and significant for each three models is the 
boundary index.  Both the coefficient and significance level increase when the control for the 
year is added, and then decrease slightly when both controls are added.  Most of the signs of 
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the other coefficients stay constant; except for the monitor index that flips to negative when 
the control for the year the well was constructed is added, however, it is not statistically 
significant.  After the Bonferroni-Holm correction the boundary index is not significant for 
any of the regressions.   
Due to the fact that there are seven “treatment” variables in each of the regressions it is 
possible that linear correlation between each index variable is creating the sign of each 
coefficient to flip or the significance level.  To test this I run 127 regression with each possible 
combination of the seven index variables.  So, for example the first seven regressions are 
index “x” against the functionality of the well.  Then the next 21 regressions are a 
combination of two of the seven variables regressed on the functionality, and so on.   I run 
this on both the binary function variable using a Linear Probablity model and “number of 
times fixed” with a Poisson estimation.  I find that the boundary index is significant at the 
10% level 60 out of the 64 possible combinations (94%) when regressed against the binary 
variable.  When regressed against “number of times fixed” the boundary index, local rules and 
sanctions were significant at the 10% level for all 64 possible combinations (100%), collective 
action 61% of the time, conflict 30% and monitor 22%.  See Table 7 and 8 for full results.  
In a recent paper Emily Oster showed the importance of accounting for coefficient 
movements and movements in R-squared values in identifying omitted variable bias through a 
bounds test. She demonstrated “that in the empirically common case with multiple observed 
controls it is also necessary to account for the share of the variation treatment accounted for 
by control variables.” (Oster, 2014) Using the Emily Oster test the new estimated beta 
coefficient for the boundary index in the OLS Index regression is .21. The delta is -7.78; a 
negative delta implies controls move coefficient further from null.    See Table 9 for full 
results.   
 
V. Conclusion  
 In this paper I examine whether Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles affect the long-run 
functionality of borehole wells in Uganda.  I find that the boundary index is significant in all 
four estimations, and remains significant after all robustness test, except in the case of the final 
OLS regression. It is also significant almost 100% when running the 127 permutations of all 
seven indices on when regressed both on the binary function and the number of times the well 
was fixed. This finding aligns with the pervious literature, in particular the meta-analysis of 91 
studies, which found boundaries to be significant a majority of the time. (Cox 2010) It is 
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important to distinguish that the boundary principle in this case is in terms of the “boundaries” 
around who uses the well rather then the physical boundaries around the well (i.e. there was a 
list kept of the users of the well, the list was updated annually, and was used to collect fees).   
When regressing the indices on “the number of times the well was fixed” local rules, sanctions, 
and conflict are significant but after the Bonferroni-Holm step-down test both conflict and 
sanctions are no longer significant.  
 Due to the qualitative nature of Ostrom’s theory, statistical-analytical work is valuable in 
identifying overall patterns in the data but it is also important to have what Agrwal refers to as a 
“close analysis” or “thick reading” of the context of the data in order to interpret the statistical 
patterns. (Argwal 2006)   During the field work and through discussions with the members of 
the Water User Committees (WUCs) and community we found that there was frequent issue of 
high iron levels in the water, which in result turned the water a deep orange color and when 
boiled turned it black. Although it was not determined whether this had any impact on the users 
health it was clear that the users were deterred not only form using the water but also 
maintaining the well.  This knowledge and other qualitative finding were essential to 
understanding how the committees functioned and the statistical analysis.   
 My results are internally valid in terms of borehole wells in Uganda, run by Water User 
Committees, but further research is needed to determine external validity.   This study shows 
that quantitative work can be used to assess Ostrom’s work and more generally the internal 
management of common pool resources, but it also demonstrates the importance of the 
circumstantial variation and qualitative nature of both the theory and practice.  Thus it should 
make us cautious when appealing it broadly in across all CPRs and resource governance.   
 The policy implications are really three-fold. In terms of the Living Water wells in 
Uganda it is imperative that the issue of water contamination in terms of the level of iron is 
addressed and remedied.  This can be accomplished by testing the underground water quality 
prior to drilling and returning six months after the well is drilled to check the quality.  Further 
research should also be conducted to determine if the contamination is due to the groundwater 
or the pipes being used in the wells themselves.  Once this is accomplished, each WUC should 
be encouraged by those who drill the wells (whether that is the government or NGO) to keep a 
detailed updated list of all the household who use the well, and the list should be used to keep 
record of those who pay the fees.   
 The second implication is in terms of decentralized government structures that were 
popularized in the 1990s based on many of the self-governance theories discussed in this paper, 
including Ostrom’s. A majority of Sub-Saharan African countries have decentralized 
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governments, which really heavily on small local level authorities or committees to disrepute 
public goods such as health care, education, and utilities and maintain CPRs such as wells, 
groundwater, forests, and in some cases fishery.  Thus it is imperative that further quantitative 
research is conducted to determine whether this type of governance is effective in delivering and 
maintaining public services and conservations.   Finally as the population increase and we put 
more pressure on Common Pool Resources it is important that further research is conducted on 
the causal relationship between different management strategies and the sustainability of the 
resource over the long-run.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chart 1: Well Functionality By Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Wells Used for Drinking Water 
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Table 1: Variables for Ostrom Design Principle Indices 
 
  Boundaries:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Household list* 60 0.333 0.475 0 1 
HH List updated* 60 0.200 0.403 0 1 
Collect Fee* 60 0.383 0.490 0 1 
      
   
  Local Rules:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Clean around 
well* 
60 0.650 0.481 0 1 
minserv* 60 0.433 0.500 0 1 
Protect the well* 60 0.600 0.494 0 1 
Fence around the 
well* 
60 0.550 0.502 0 1 
Finance training* 60 0.600 0.494 0 1 
Group training* 60 0.633 0.486 0 1 
Trouble shooting 
training* 
60 0.617 0.490 0 1 
Maintenance 
repair training * 
60 0.600 0.494 0 1 
Mobilization 
training* 
60 0.683 0.469 0 1 
      
   
  Collective Action: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Constitution* 60 0.700 0.462 0 1 
By laws* 60 0.783 0.415 0 1 
Bylaw understood  51 2.152 0.588 1 4 
Rules can change 47 2.381 0.567 2 4 
Rules are perceived 
as fair 
50 4.030 0.933 1 5 
Community is 
engaged* 
60 0.517 0.504 0 1 
Committee elect 52 1.420 0.492 1 3 
Rules can be 
revised* 
60 0.783 0.415 0 1 
Rules are known 51 3.874 1.025 1 5 
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  Monitoring:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Caretaker* 60 0.667 0.475 0 1 
Watchman* 60 0.0833 0.279 0 1 
      
 
  Sanctions:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Prohibit behavior* 60 0.550 0.502 0 1 
Sanction* 60 0.767 0.427 0 1 
Wash clothes 60 2.651 2.361 0 7 
Wash jerry can 60 4.306 2.989 0 7 
Water cow 60 1.189 1.104 0 6 
Vandalize 60 3.172 2.331 0 7 
Refuse to pay fee 60 2.825 2.145 0 7 
Defecate 60 1.999 1.580 0 7 
      
   
  Conflict Resolution:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Call Meetings* 60 0.583 0.497 0 1 
Change Rules* 60 0.0667 0.252 0 1 
Have Sanctions* 60 0.767 0.427 0 1 
      
   
 Authorities:  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Who formed 
Committee* 
52 2.168 0.587 1 4 
Committee is 
registered* 
60 0.183 0.390 0 1 
      
 
* In the description of a variable an asterisk indicates that the variable takes only two values, 0 and 1. 
** Histogram is relatively normally distributed  
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Table 2: Cross-tabulation of Individual Variables and Functionality 
           
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
Registered  0 1 
   
Organized  0 1 
  0 21 28 49 42.86% 
 
0 7 8 15 46.67% 
1 3 8 11 72.73% 
 
1 13 24 37 64.86% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 20 32 52 
 
           
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
Use H20 0 1 
   
Clean BH 0 1 
  0 20 7 27 74.07% 
 
0 12 9 21 57.14% 
1 4 29 33 87.88% 
 
1 12 27 39 69.23% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 24 36 60 
 
           
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
Drink H20 0 1 
   
Revise Rules 0 1 
  0 20 15 35 57.14% 
 
0 9 4 13 69.23% 
1 4 21 25 84.00% 
 
1 15 32 47 68.09% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 24 36 60 
 
      
 
 
    
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
HH List 0 1 
   
Caretaker 0 1 
  0 22 18 40 55.00% 
 
0 12 8 20 60.00% 
1 2 18 20 90.00% 
 
1 12 28 40 70.00% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 
  
60 
 
           
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
Bylaws 0 1 
   
Fees Collected 0 1 
  0 8 5 13 61.54% 
 
0 19 18 37 51.35% 
1 16 31 47 65.96% 
 
1 5 18 23 78.26% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 24 36 60 
 
           
 
Function Total Percent 
  
Function Total Percent 
Train Finance 0 1 
   
Train Org. 0 1 
  0 13 11 24 54.17% 
 
0 13 9 22 59.09% 
1 11 25 36 69.44% 
 
1 11 27 38 71.05% 
Total 24 36 60 
  
Total 24 36 60 
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Table 3: Relationship Between Ostrom Design Principles and Dependent Variable  
 
Dependent Variable 
Binary 
Function 
Fix Repair Function 
Index 
Ostrom 
Boundary  0.3624 0.5678*** 0.4651*** 0.2895 
Local Rules  0.1131 .4725** 0.4356 0.183 
Collective  0.1323 0.3372 0.301 0.1637 
Monitor  0.1124 0.3167 0.282 0.1307 
Sanction  0.0454 0.3865* 0.3683 0.1346 
Conflict  0.1041 0.2967 0.2908 0.2561 
Authority  0.1104 0.0644 0.0377 0.0684 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor, sanction, 
conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique information in a set of 
variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally.  Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.   
 
Column (1) is the binary function; column (2) is how many times it was fixed; column (3) is number of times the well 
needed to be repaired; and column (4) is the index of all three. 
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Table 4: Binary Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Function Binary Function Binary Function Binary 
    
Boundary  0.295*** 1.663*** 1.030*** 
 (0.0972) (0.601) (0.353) 
Local Rules -0.0103 -0.220 -0.144 
 (0.141) (0.695) (0.415) 
Collective  0.261 1.461 0.868 
 (0.243) (1.265) (0.763) 
Monitor  0.0242 0.225 0.137 
 (0.104) (0.506) (0.316) 
Sanction  -0.0712 -0.408 -0.236 
 (0.127) (0.619) (0.377) 
Conflict  -0.0969 -0.295 -0.162 
 (0.139) (0.691) (0.417) 
Authority  0.00123 -0.117 -0.0812 
 (0.106) (0.538) (0.319) 
Condition of H20  0.127 0.667* 0.410* 
 (0.0772) (0.396) (0.238) 
Year Constructed 0.0385 0.139 0.0716 
 (0.0618) (0.317) (0.176) 
Constant -77.20 -280.5 -144.8 
 (124.3) (638.1) (354.3) 
    
Observations 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.204   
I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective 
action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance 
weighting to capture unique information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables 
equally.  Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.   
 
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether the well i functioned at the time of survey. 
Column (1) is a Linear Probability Model (2) is a Logit Model and (3) is a Probit Model and 
includes the following controls: condition of the water (ranking variable) and the year the well 
was constructed.  
 
Standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1  
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Table 5: Poisson Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Fixed Repaired 
   
Boundary  0.697*** 0.365*** 
 (0.159) (0.136) 
Local Rules  0.787*** 0.397** 
 (0.246) (0.202) 
Collective  0.727 0.294 
 (0.529) (0.387) 
Monitor  0.0369 -0.0330 
 (0.234) (0.130) 
Sanction  0.488* 0.282 
 (0.267) (0.213) 
Conflict  -0.394* 0.0418 
 (0.234) (0.184) 
Authority  -0.0513 -0.112 
 (0.163) (0.152) 
Condition of H20  -0.445* -0.426** 
 (0.253) (0.176) 
Year Constructed -0.309*** -0.318*** 
 (0.105) (0.121) 
Constant 623.0*** 641.7*** 
 (210.3) (242.9) 
   
Observations 58 58 
 
I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective 
action, monitor, sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance 
weighting to capture unique information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables 
equally.  Refer to Table 1 for variables used in each individual index.   
 
The dependent variable in Column (1) is a count variable for how many times well i was 
repaired from time of construction to time of survey. The dependent variable in Column (2) is 
a count variable for how many times well i broke.  Both models include the following controls: 
condition of the water (ranking variable) and the year the well was constructed.  
 
Robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1  
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Table 6: OLS Estimations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Function Index Function Index Function Index Function Index 
     
Boundary  0.169* 0.167** 0.195** 0.187** 
 (0.0865) (0.0790) (0.0917) (0.0819) 
Local Rules  -0.0455 -0.0509 -0.0738 -0.0867 
 (0.166) (0.184) (0.167) (0.189) 
Collective  0.0932 0.0914 0.109 0.104 
 (0.250) (0.254) (0.255) (0.260) 
Monitor  0.0137 0.0125 -0.00541 -0.00716 
 (0.0829) (0.0851) (0.0853) (0.0886) 
Sanction  -0.0280 -0.0320 -0.00949 -0.0199 
 (0.137) (0.134) (0.142) (0.141) 
Conflict  0.178 0.183 0.186 0.202 
 (0.173) (0.184) (0.175) (0.189) 
Authority  -0.0843 -0.0879 -0.0662 -0.0700 
 (0.156) (0.163) (0.155) (0.163) 
Condition of H20  - -0.00988 - -0.0308 
  (0.0783)  (0.0876) 
Year Constructed - - -0.0875 -0.0919 
   (0.0692) (0.0744) 
Constant 3.23e-08 0.0305 175.9 184.8 
 (0.0639) (0.246) (139.2) (149.8) 
     
Observations 60 58 60 58 
R-squared 0.128 0.125 0.160 0.159 
 
I use the method outlined in Anderson (2008) to create the boundary, local rules, collective action, monitor, 
sanction, conflict and authority index. This method uses inverse covariance weighting to capture unique 
information in a set of variables, opposed to weighting all variables equally.  Refer to Table 1 for variables used in 
each individual index.   
 
The dependent variable is a Anderson (2008) index of functionality. The index is based on whether the well 
functioned at the time of survey, how many times the well broke and how many times it was repaired.  Column 
(1)  includes no controls (2) controls for the condition of the water (3) controls for the year the well was 
constructed,  and (4) controls for both condition of the water and the year the well was constructed.  
 
Standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
! 32 
Table 7: Percent of Times Significant Out of 127 OLS Combinations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Percent of Times Significant Out of 127 Poisson Combinations 
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Table 9: Stata Output from the Emily Oster Test 
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Table 10 
Summary of Key Research (papers published in reputable publications with more then 50 citations) 
Title Author Journal Cited Type Resource Region 
Explaining success on the commons: Community forest governance in the Indian 
Himalaya Agrawal, A World Development 2006 203 Empirical Forest Asia 
Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South 
India Bardhan, P 
Economic Development and 
Change 310 Empirical Irrigation Asia 
Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and 
Botswana. Blaikie P World Development 2006 394 Descriptive 
 
Africa 
Moral ecological rationality, institutions and the management of common property 
resources Cleaver Development and change 271 Case Study Wells Africa 
Paradoxes of participation: questioning participatory approaches to development 
Cleaver 
Journal of International 
Development 1999 555 Descriptive 
 
Africa 
A lack of institutional demand: why a strong local community in Western Ecuador 
fails to protect its forest 
Gibson CC, Becker 
CD 
People and Forests: Communities, 
Institutions, and Governance.  98 Case Study Forest 
Latin 
America 
Institutional choice, community, and struggle: A case study of forest co-management in 
Mexico Klooster World Development 2000 212 Case Study Forest 
Latin 
America 
The common property regime of the Huaorani 
Indians of Ecuador: Implications and challenges to conservation 
Lu, F.E. Human Ecology 2001 57 Case Study Forest 
Latin 
America 
Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: the case of the Yanesha forestry 
cooperative 
Morrow CE, Hull 
RW World Development 1996 93 Case Study Forest 
Latin 
America 
The symbolic making of a common property resource: History, ecology and locality in 
atank‐irrigated landscape in South India 
Mosse, D Development and change,1997 263 
Case 
Study/Theory Irrigation Asia 
What makes community forest management successful: a meta-study from community 
forests throughout the world. 
Pagdee, A, Kim Y, 
Daugherty PJ  Society and Natural Resources, 2006 244 Meta-Analysis Forest Worldwide 
Design principles and common pool resource management: An institutional approach to 
evaluating community management in semi-arid Tanzania Quinn,  Huby, 
Kiwasila, ovett  
Journal of Environmental 
Management 62 Empirical* Multiple Africa 
Organized participatory resource management: insights from community forestry 
practices in India 
Sekhe, M Forest Policy and Economics, 2011 60 Empirical* Multiple Asia 
Common property, collective action and community Singleton S, 
Taylor M Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992 193 Descriptive Multiple Worldwide 
Collective action in common-pool resource management: The contribution of a social 
constructivist perspective to existing theory 
Steins, Edwards Society and Natural Resources, 1999 101 
Case 
Study/Theory Fishery Europe 
Constraints on collective action in a transitional economy: the case of Bulgaria's irrigation 
sector Theesfeld World Development 2004 93 Empirical* Irrigation  Europe 
Decision-making arrangements in community-based watershed management in northern 
Thailand 
Wittayapak, 
Dearden  Society and Natural Resources, 1999 66 Case Study Irrigation  Asia 
